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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 The Secretary raises three issues: 
1. Whether Virginia has standing to defend its legal code. 
2. Whether the district court erred in holding that the mandate 
and penalty exceed Congress‘s power under the Commerce 
Clause. 
 
3. Whether the mandate and penalty can be upheld under the 
taxing power. 
 
Virginia raises two additional issues: 
1. Whether the mandate and penalty can be severed from the rest 
of the enactment. 
 
2. If so, what is the proper scope of severance.  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The United States Senate passed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(―PPACA‖), on Christmas Eve 2009 on a straight party line vote.  
PPACA was passed, without committee hearing or report, employing 
such florid deal-making as to generate scornful popular terms like ―the 
Louisiana Purchase‖ and ―the Cornhusker Kick-back.‖  (See J.A. 354-
55).   
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 2 
 At the heart of PPACA is § 1501, which generally requires 
American citizens to purchase a good or service from other citizens, 
namely, a health insurance policy.  Although Congress purported to be 
exercising Commerce Clause powers in enacting PPACA, this claim was 
known to be problematical.  When the Senate Finance Committee asked 
the Congressional Research Service whether a mandate supported by a 
penalty would be constitutional, the response was equivocal:  ―Whether 
such a requirement would be constitutional under the Commerce 
Clause is perhaps the most challenging question posed by such a 
proposal, as it is a novel issue whether Congress may use this clause to 
require an individual to purchase a good or a service.‖  (J.A. 354).  
Because an intervening election in Massachusetts removed the 
availability of cloture in the Senate, PPACA was passed by the House of 
Representatives unaltered, and then subjected to minor amendment in 
a reconciliation process dealing as much with college loans as with 
health care.  Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.   
 At the 2010 Session of the Virginia General Assembly, the 
Virginia Health Care Freedom Act, Virginia Code § 38.2-3430.1:1, had 
been enacted with the assent of the Governor.  That act provides in 
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pertinent part:   
No resident of this Commonwealth, regardless of whether he 
has or is eligible for health insurance coverage under any 
policy or program provided by or through his employer, or a 
plan sponsored by the Commonwealth or the Federal 
Government, shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy 
of individual insurance coverage except as required by a 
Court or the Department of Social Services where an 
individual is named a party in a judicial or administrative 
proceeding. 
 
This legislation was enacted in several identical versions with margins 
as high as 90 to 3 in the House of Delegates and 25 to 15 in the Senate.  
At the time of enactment, the Republicans controlled the Virginia 
House of Delegates while the Democrats controlled the Virginia Senate.  
(J.A. 341-42).  
 The Attorney General of Virginia has the duty to defend the 
legislative enactments of the Commonwealth.  Virginia Code §§ 2.2-507; 
2.2-513.  When the President signed PPACA on March 23, 2010, the 
validity of both the federal and state enactments was drawn into 
question.  If PPACA were supported by an enumerated power, then it 
would prevail under the Supremacy Clause.  If not, the Virginia statute 
would be a valid exercise of the police powers reserved to the States.  In 
order to resolve this conflict, Virginia filed a Complaint in federal Court 
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 4 
for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief.  (J.A. 28-37). 
 The gravamen of the Complaint was that the claimed power to 
require a citizen to purchase a good or a service from another citizen 
lacks any principled limit and is tantamount to a national police power.  
Since Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Supreme Court has 
gone no further than to hold that Congress can regulate (1) ―use of the 
channels of interstate commerce,‖ (2) ―the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons and things in interstate commerce,‖ 
and (3) ―activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.‖  
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (emphasis added).  
Section 1501 of PPACA seeks to regulate inactivity affecting interstate 
commerce, a claimed power well in excess of the affirmative outer limits 
of the Commerce Clause heretofore recognized, even as executed by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  
This claimed power also violates the negative outer limits of the 
Commerce Clause identified in Lopez and in United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000).  As was stated by the Supreme Court in Morrison: 
―We always have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the 
scope of federal power that would permit Congress to exercise a police 
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power.‖  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19.  
 The Secretary filed a motion to dismiss premised upon lack of 
standing, the Anti-Injunction Act, ripeness, and failure to state a claim.  
The motion was briefed and argued.  Regarding standing, Virginia 
argued that States suffer a sovereign injury and have standing to claim 
that the federal government is acting in excess of its enumerated 
powers whenever their code of laws is attacked or whenever they are 
otherwise commanded to give way.  See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 
(1992); Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (―a State clearly has a 
legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes‖); 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62, 65 (1986) (―a State has standing to 
defend the constitutionality of its statute‖); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. 
v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982) (―[T]he power to 
create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal‖ is a core state 
function); Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d 1236, 1242 
(10th Cir. 2008) (State has standing to defend the efficacy of its 
expungement statute from threatened federal pre-emption); Texas 
Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 449 (5th Cir. 
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1999) (States have a sovereign interest in the power to create a legal 
code); Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, 868 F.2d 441, 443-45 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989) (preemptive effect [of federal regulations] is sufficient to 
confer standing); Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, 766 F.2d 228, 
232-33 (6th Cir. 1985) (same).   
 The Secretary argued in the alternative that the mandate and 
penalty are supported by the taxing power.  But there is a justiciable 
difference between a tax and a penalty.  United States v. La Franca, 282 
U.S. 568, 572 (1931).  ―‗A tax is an enforced contribution to provide for 
the support of government; a penalty . . . is an exaction imposed by 
statute as punishment for an unlawful act.‘‖  United States v. 
Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996) 
(quoting La Franca).  Furthermore, even if the penalty had been 
denominated a tax, ―there comes a time in the extension of the 
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as 
such and becomes a mere penalty . . . .‘‖  Dep’t of Revenue of Montana v. 
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994).  See also United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 
(1922).  Because the penalty requires a supporting enumerated power 
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independent of the taxing power the tax argument collapses back into 
the Commerce Clause argument.   
 The district court denied the motion to dismiss.  Virginia ex rel. 
Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010).    
 The Secretary filed her Answer, and the parties filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment, joining issue on the Commerce 
Clause and the taxing power.  
 The district court granted Virginia‘s Motion for Summary 
Judgment and declared the mandate unconstitutional.  (J.A. 1111-12, 
1115).  The Secretary filed her Notice of Appeal, (J.A. 1118), and, 
because the district court had ruled that the mandate and penalty were 
severable, Virginia also filed a Notice of Appeal.  (J.A. 1121).  The cases 
were consolidated by this Court.      
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 The Secretary relies upon various publications to argue that the 
health care market is large; the individual need for health care is 
temporally unpredictable; procedures are expensive; and government 
intervention in the market mandates treatment without regard to 
ability to pay in many cases.  She notes that, in 2009, 32% of health 
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care costs were paid by private insurance and 35% by Medicare and 
Medicaid; the uninsured consume $100 billion in health care services 
annually, but $43 billion of this amount is not paid to the provider; 
―Congress further found that health care providers pass on a significant 
portion of these costs ‗to private insurers, which pass on the cost to 
families‘‖; private coverage has declined since 2000; and 
non-employment based insurance is difficult to obtain because of cost 
and underwriting for pre-existing conditions.  (Doc. 21 at 19-25).   
PPACA ―bars insurers from refusing coverage because of pre-
existing medical conditions, cancelling insurance absent fraud or 
intentional misrepresentation of material fact, charging higher 
premiums based on a person‘s medical history, and placing lifetime caps 
on benefits the policyholder can receive.‖  (Doc. 21 at 27).  Because this 
creates a perverse incentive for young healthy people to purchase 
insurance only after they fall ill, Congress imposed the unprecedented 
mandate enforced by a penalty. 
 These matters do not implicate evidentiary facts.  Some of these 
arguments – those based upon Congressional findings – do implicate 
legislative facts.  The Secretary‘s evident purpose in reciting them is to 
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bolster her position that the mandate and penalty are necessary to 
PPACA in the senses of being expedient and integral to congressional 
purpose.  This highlights a fundamental difference between the position 
of the Secretary and that of Virginia.  Virginia submits that regardless 
of the perceived exigencies of the day, no claim of federal power can be 
necessary and proper if it is without principled limits.  Morrison, 529 
U.S. at 618-19 (―We always have rejected readings of the Commerce 
Clause and the scope of Federal power that would permit Congress to 
exercise a police power.‖)     
 That the mandate and penalty were central to the scheme, 
however, does have significant consequences on the severance issue.  It 
is as obvious as any such matter can ever be that PPACA would not 
have been enacted without the unconstitutional mandate and penalty.  
Under the legislative bargain analysis of Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 
480 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1987), PPACA should have been declared 
unconstitutional in its entirety.  Failing that, the district court should 
have stricken both the private insurance and Medicare/Medicaid 
changes under Alaska Airlines, because those provisions cannot 
function as intended without the mandate and penalty.  In the 
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alternative, the district court should have accepted the Secretary‘s 
concession that ―insurance industry reforms‖ were not severable from 
the mandate and penalty.  (J.A. 901-02).  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Standing  
 Whenever a State has its code of laws brought into question by 
federal action, such that it will have to give way under the Supremacy 
Clause if the federal enactment is valid, the State has suffered a 
sovereign injury and has standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
the federal enactment.  This is settled law in the Supreme Court and is 
the law of the Circuit in the Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and District of 
Columbia Circuits.  The federal government claims such standing for 
itself and has prevailed in establishing the proposition in the Supreme 
Court and in the Federal Circuit.  There is no principled reason why 
such standing would not apply equally to Virginia. 
Commerce Clause  
 Wickard and Raich currently mark the affirmative outer limits of 
congressional power under the Commerce Clause, even as aided by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause: activities that in the aggregate 
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substantially affect interstate commerce.  Lopez and Morrison mark the 
negative outer limits of the Commerce Clause: the Supreme Court 
always rejects readings of the Commerce Clause and of federal power in 
general that are tantamount to a federal police power.  Because the 
claimed power to order a citizen to purchase a good or service from 
another citizen has no principled limit, it violates the negative outer 
limits of the Commerce Clause.  This should come as no surprise to 
Congress, which was warned by the Congressional Research Service 
that the claimed power was wholly unprecedented.  
Necessary and Proper Clause  
 The power to regulate activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce is itself an application of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.  As John Marshall noted, any legitimate use of the clause must 
be consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution.  As the 
Supreme Court ruled in Printz, violations of structural federalism 
violate the ―proper‖ prong of the clause.  Extending congressional power 
to the point of requiring a citizen to purchase a good or service from 
another citizen violates structural federalism because it is tantamount 
to a national police power.  
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Taxing Power  
To date, the Secretary‘s argument that the mandate and penalty 
represent an exercise of the taxing power has not been accepted by any 
federal court which has considered it.  The argument must be rejected 
because the penalty is an exaction imposed for a failure to comply with 
a governmental command.  Thus, in both name1 and operation, the 
penalty is a true penalty and not a tax.   
Because the penalty is a true penalty and not a tax, it requires an 
enumerated power for its support.  Because the only imaginable 
enumerated power that could support the penalty would be the 
Commerce Clause, the tax argument collapses back into the Commerce 
Clause argument.  
Severance  
 Because it is clear that Congress would not have passed PPACA 
without the mandate and penalty, those provisions cannot be severed 
under Alaska Airlines.  Even if they could be, the district court was 
                                            
1 Even if the penalty had been called a tax, it would still be a penalty for 
constitutional purposes.  As the Supreme Court has recognized on 
multiple occasions, there comes a point where an exaction, even if it is 
labeled a tax, is a regulatory penalty that must be supported by an 
enumerated power other than the taxing power. 
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required to sever at the joint.  Doing so would invalidate all insurance, 
Medicare, and Medicaid changes.  At a minimum, the district court 
should have accepted the Secretary‘s concession that all private 
insurance regulation falls with the mandate and penalty.  
ARGUMENT 
I. VIRGINIA HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
MANDATE AND PENALTY.  
On appeal, the Secretary belabors the same parens patriae 
strawman she belabored below.  Virginia renounced any reliance on 
parens patriae standing in the district court (J.A. 112), and does so 
again here.  Furthermore, parens patriae and proprietary state 
standing are types of quasi-sovereign standing.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497, 519-20 (2007).  Neither has anything to do with sovereign 
standing.  See, e.g., Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137 (―a State clearly has a 
legitimate interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes‖); 
Diamond, 476 U.S. at 62 (―a State has standing to defend the 
constitutionality of its statute‖). 
According to the Supreme Court, this principle is not complicated.  
Speaking in Snapp, the Court said that two core sovereign interests 
remaining with the states are easily identified:  
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First, the exercise of sovereign power over individuals 
and entities within the relevant jurisdiction - - this 
involves the power to create and enforce a legal 
code, both civil and criminal; second, the demand 
for recognition from other sovereigns - - most 
frequently this involves the maintenance and 
recognition of borders.  The former is regularly at 
issue in constitutional litigation.  The latter is also 
a frequent subject of litigation, particularly [under the 
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.]  
 
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601 (emphasis added).  See also, Diamond, 476 U.S. 
at 65.  
 In advancing her parens patriae strawman, the Secretary, in an 
error adopted by several amici, makes statements about the Virginia 
law that are simply incorrect.  She asserts:  ―The statute applies to no 
entities other than the federal government.‖  (Doc. 21 at 37).  But as 
Virginia pointed out below, the Virginia statute prevents any private 
employer from requiring insurance.  (J.A. 241, 247).  Because Virginia is 
a Dillon Rule State, the law also prevents any locality from requiring 
insurance.  (J.A. 241).  Nor is it true that ―Virginia has not suggested 
that it serves any other function other than purportedly to create 
standing here.‖  (Doc. 21 at 38).  Virginia‘s law is one of broad 
application.  (J.A. 241, 247).  Nor does it matter that there is no express 
machinery of enforcement.  Many federal statutes lack such machinery 
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but are enforceable at the instance of the Attorney General.  See, e.g., 
Title 1 § 7; Title 8 § 1623; Title 28 § 1738C.  Similarly, nothing would 
prevent the Attorney General of Virginia from bringing an injunction 
suit against a Virginia locality that purported to require health 
insurance.  Cf. United States v. Republic Steel, Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 492 
(1960) (citing United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888) 
(―[T]he Attorney General [of the United States] could bring suit, even 
though Congress had not given specific authority.  The test was 
whether the United States had an interest to protect or defend.‖)).  And 
while Virginia is for most purposes an at-will employment state, a 
private employee discharged in violation of the Virginia law would have 
a claim for wrongful termination under the public policy exception to 
the at-will rule.  Rowan v. Tractor Supply Co., 559 S.E.2d 709 (Va. 
2002).    
 The Secretary reads Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), 
as though Diamond had never been decided, leading her to declare:  
―Virginia‘s declaratory statute is immaterial; the Supreme Court would 
not have reached a different conclusion in Mellon if the state had first 
incorporated its complaint into a statute declaring that no 
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Massachusetts citizen could be required to pay federal taxes to support 
the challenged federal program.‖  (Doc. 21 at 39).  The first thing to be 
noticed is that this assertion is supported by no citation.  The second 
thing which should be noticed is that the text of Mellon refutes the 
Secretary‘s argument.  The reason why Massachusetts‘ claim was found 
to be too abstract to confer standing was that the challenged federal 
statute did not ―require the States to do or to yield anything.‖  Mellon, 
262 U.S. at 482.  See also New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328 (1926) 
(State claims abstract because no right of State was being or about to be 
affected); Texas v. ICC, 258 U.S. 158 (1922) (same).  
 The Secretary‘s disdain of the States as joint sovereigns is 
reflected in her argument that it would be surprising and unsound if ―a 
State could generate standing to challenge a federal law merely by 
passing a State law to contradict it‖ (Doc. 21 at 41); as though the 
enactment of a law is a matter of no consequence or is some kind of low 
trick.  A State acting within the scope of its sovereign interests is 
uniquely different from any other litigant precisely because of its power 
to establish a code of laws.  The Secretary‘s hypotheticals, positing that 
a State could legislate against Social Security taxes or the federal war 
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powers, fail to appreciate that litigants frequently have standing to lose 
on the merits. 
 The Secretary has adopted the position of conceding individual 
standing to challenge PPACA on enumerated powers grounds in the 
appeals of Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 
(E.D. Mich. 2010), and Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner, No. 
6:10cv15, 2010 WL 4860299, (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010), while arguing 
that Virginia, as a joint sovereign, is categorically disabled from 
mounting an enumerated powers challenge in defense of its own code of 
laws.  This inverts one of the foundational purposes of the federal court 
system: to address competing claims of state and federal powers.  As 
Justice O‘Connor noted in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 155 
(internal citations omitted):  
In 1788, in the course of explaining to the citizens of 
New York why the recently drafted Constitution 
provided for federal courts, Alexander Hamilton 
observed: ―The erection of a new government, whatever 
care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to 
originate questions of intricacy and nicety; and these 
may, in a particular manner, be expected to flow from 
the establishment of a constitution founded upon the 
total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct 
sovereignties.‖  Hamilton‘s prediction has proved quite 
accurate.  While no one disputes the proposition that 
―the Constitution created a Federal Government of 
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limited powers,‖ and while the Tenth Amendment 
makes explicit that ―the powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people‖; the task of ascertaining the 
constitutional line between federal and state power has 
given rise to many of the Court‘s most difficult and 
celebrated cases.  At least as far back as Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, the Court has resolved questions ―of 
great importance and delicacy‖ in determining whether 
particular sovereign powers have been granted by the 
Constitution to the Federal Government or have been 
retained by the States.    
 
The Virginia law transforms Tenth Amendment issues of the sort found 
to be merely abstract in Mellon into an immediate and concrete dispute 
within the ambit of the sovereign standing cases.  Not only is the 
concept of sovereign standing firmly established in the Supreme Court, 
but in the Circuit Courts of Appeals as well.  Alaska v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Transp., 868 F.2d at 443-45 (recognizing state sovereign standing); 
Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d at 449 (same); 
Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of Transportation, 766 F.2d at 232-33 (same); 
Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United States, 539 F.3d at 1242 (same).      
 The Secretary‘s use of case authority is highly selective.  She 
continues to cite Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522-23 (Doc. 21 at 
41), although it was pointed out below that that is a quasi-sovereign 
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standing case with no direct application to this case.  (J.A. 112).  She 
refuses to acknowledge the very existence of Diamond, 476 U.S. at 65, 
although it was cited by the court below in its standing analysis.  (J.A. 
302-03). 
 Where the Secretary does discuss a case of central relevance to the 
district court‘s standing analysis, she does so in a way that is entirely 
unfair to that court.  (Doc. 21 at 40).  Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600, contains a 
straight-forward discussion of the taxonomy of state standing.  In 
seeking to determine whether Puerto Rico had quasi-sovereign standing 
to bring a parens patriae action in that case, the Court began by 
contrasting such standing with the full, sovereign standing of the type 
enjoyed by Virginia in this case.  
Its nature [quasi-sovereign standing] is perhaps best 
understood by comparing it to other kinds of interests 
that a State may pursue and then by examining those 
interests that have historically been found to fall 
within this category.  
Two sovereign interests are easily identified:  
First, the exercise of sovereign power over individuals 
and entities within the relevant jurisdiction - - this 
involves the power to create and enforce a legal code, 
both civil and criminal; second, the demand for 
recognition from other sovereigns - - most frequently 
this involves the maintenance and recognition of 
borders. The former is regularly at issue in 
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constitutional litigation.  The latter is also a frequent 
subject of litigation, particularly in this Court . . . .  
Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600.  In dealing with that case, the Secretary 
proceeds first by totally ignoring the quoted language and then  
purports to distinguish the case on the irrelevant grounds that Snapp is 
a parens patriae case.  (Doc. 21 at 40).  
This is not only unfair, but is odd given the Secretary‘s apparent 
acceptance of Wyoming ex rel. Crank as good law.  (Doc. 21 at 42).  In 
that case, the Tenth Circuit stated:  ―The States have a legally 
protected sovereign interest in ‗the exercise of sovereign power over 
individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction [, which] 
involves the power to create and enforce a legal code,‘‖ 539 F.3d at 1242 
(quoting Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601).  The Tenth Circuit concluded:  
―Federal regulatory action that preempts state law creates a sufficient 
injury-in-fact to satisfy this prong‖ of standing.  Id.  Given that 
Wyoming ex rel. Crank is the principal authority upon which the district 
court relied in its standing ruling (J.A. 310-11), the failure of the 
Secretary to question the status of that case as good law leaves her 
without a coherent explanation of why she thinks that the district court 
erred.  
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At the close of her standing argument (Doc. 21 at 42), the 
Secretary makes three concessions which should prove fatal to her 
position.  First, she acknowledges that ―[a] State likewise may challenge 
a measure that commands the State to take action.‖  Second, she 
acknowledges that a State may challenge a measure ―that prohibits 
specified State action.‖  Finally, the Secretary asserts:  ―Nor is this a 
case in which federal action ‗interferes with [a State‘s] ability to enforce 
its own legal code.‘‖  The Secretary continues:  ―The Commonwealth‘s 
suit has none of those features.‖  (Doc. 21 at 42).  But clearly this suit 
implicates the last two features.  It is only possible for the Secretary to 
argue the contrary because of her erroneous view of the scope of the 
Virginia law.  Were she ever to concede its true scope and reach, 
Virginia would be seen to have standing even under the Secretary‘s 
view.   
Standing is merely an aid for determining the existence of an 
Article III case or controversy.  The purposes of standing, to ensure that 
the parties ―have ‗such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the 
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for 
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illumination,‘‖ are easily made out here.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. at 517 (internal citation omitted).  When the claimed powers of the 
States and the federal government collide, the Supreme Court usually 
addresses the merits without even addressing standing.  See, e.g., New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 144; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 
(1970).  
Finally, it should be noted that the Secretary‘s views on sovereign 
standing contrast sharply with the position of the United States in 
other cases.  In Stauffer v. Brooks Brothers, Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 
(Fed. Cir. 2010), the United States successfully argued that 
disobedience of its laws ―is a sufficient injury in fact‖ to confer sovereign 
standing.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Vermont Agency of 
Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000), stated:  ―It 
is beyond doubt that the complaintant asserts an injury to the United 
States - - both the injury to its sovereignty arising from the violation of 
its laws . . . and the proprietary injury resulting from the alleged fraud.‖  
If sovereign standing runs in favor of the United States, there is no 
principled reason why it does not also run in favor of Virginia, a joint 
sovereign.   
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II.   THE MANDATE AND PENALTY ARE BEYOND THE 
OUTER LIMITS OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE. 
 In PPACA, Congress asserted its Commerce Clause powers in 
enacting the mandate and penalty.  But the Supreme Court has never 
extended the Commerce Clause beyond the regulation of (1) ―use of the 
channels of interstate commerce;‖ (2) ―the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons and things in interstate commerce,‖ 
and (3) ―activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.‖  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (emphasis added). 
The passive status of being uninsured falls within none of these 
categories.  In her Answer, the Secretary pled that the status of being 
uninsured is ―an economic decision‖ that ―has a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce.‖  (J.A. 333-34).  This strange and awkward 
formulation underscores the correctness of the district court‘s ruling 
that the Secretary‘s position is well outside of the currently established 
limits of the Commerce Clause.  On appeal, the Secretary argues that 
the mandate ―regulates the means of payment for services in the 
interstate healthcare market‖ (Doc. 21 at 44-45) – even though it is 
obvious that it expressly regulates inactivity antecedent to any activity 
for which payment would be required.  Although the Commonwealth‘s 
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position is in accord with existing precedent, acceptance of the 
Secretary‘s position would require a change in the law.   
It is true that the Secretary also pled in her answer that 
―Congress had a rational basis to conclude that the minimum coverage 
provision is essential to ensure the success of the [Act‘s] larger 
regulation of the interstate health insurance market.‖  (J.A. 333).  This 
argument is repeated on appeal.  (Doc. 21 at 47-52).  But this is simply 
a reference to the Necessary and Proper Clause, which cannot be 
employed contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.  
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).  Because 
the power claimed here would alter the federal structure of the 
Constitution by creating an unlimited federal power indistinguishable 
from a national police power, it cannot be a proper use of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (―We always have 
rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal 
power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power.‖).  
According to Justice Breyer, the potential sources of constitutional 
construction include ―language, history, tradition, precedent, purpose, 
and consequence,‖ Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty 8 (Vintage Books) 
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(2006), although the last two are subject to debate.  Id. at 78-80, 115-16.  
The Secretary refused to engage with language, history or tradition in 
the district court, and she avoids them here as well –because they 
demonstrate that the claimed power to regulate present inactivity in 
anticipation of future activity represents a qualitative change in the 
law.   
A. The Mandate and Penalty are Not Supported by 
the Text of the Commerce Clause.  
 Article I, § 8 of the Constitution provides that ―The Congress shall 
have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.‖  If the Founders 
accepted contemporary suggestions that the word ―commerce‖ is derived 
from the Latin commercium, see N. Baily, Dictionarium Britannicum or 
a more complete Universal Etymological English Dictionary than any 
Extant (London 1730), and A Pocket Dictionary (3d ed. London 1765) 
(Library of Virginia), then they would have understood commerce as 
comprehending ―traffick, dealing, merchandise, buying and selling, 
bartering of wares; also an intercourse or correspondence of dealing; 
acquaintance, converse; business, affair; intelligence.‖  Adam Littleton, 
Dr. Adam Littleton’s Latin dictionary, in four Parts: I. An English-
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Latin, II. A Latin-classical, III. A Latin-Proper, IV. A Latin-barbarous, 
Part II (no pagination) (6th ed. London 1735) (Library of Virginia).  Or 
had they consulted John Mair, The Tyro’s Dictionary, Latin and English 
at 96 (2d ed. Edinburgh 1763) (Library of Virginia with autograph of P. 
Henry, and of Patrick Henry Fontaine), they would have seen the word 
defined as ―trade, traffic, commerce, intercourse.‖  Those who stopped 
with an English dictionary might have seen commerce defined as ―trade 
or traffick in buying or selling.‖  N. Baily, supra.  This collection of 
terms is the way that the word was historically understood both in 
language and law.  Noah Webster in 1828 defined commerce as ―an 
interchange or mutual change of goods, wares, productions, or property 
of any kind, between nations or individuals, either by barter, or by 
purchase and sale; trade; traffick.‖  An American Dictionary of the 
English Language at 42 (S. Converse New York 1828) (facsimile).  
These terms echo in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 
(1824) (―Commerce, undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more:  it 
is intercourse.  It describes the commercial intercourse between nations, 
and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing 
rules for carrying on that intercourse.‖).   
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Those in the founding generation distinguished between 
commerce on the one hand, and manufacturing or agriculture on the 
other.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 586 (Thomas J., concurring).  Although they 
were considered distinct, they are not unrelated.  Almost all 
manufacture is done for trade.  And while pure subsistence farming is 
possible, what farmer will forgo profit from his surplus?  Mr. Filburn in 
the famous wheat case was subject to a marketing order because it was 
his practice to feed his wheat to his cattle and poultry, some of which he 
then sold, together with eggs and milk.  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 
114, 118-19.  (Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 defined marketing 
wheat ―in addition to its conventional meaning‖ as including ―feeding 
(in any form) to poultry or livestock which, or the products of which, are 
sold, bartered, or exchanged.‖).  Even where an agricultural product is 
raised for home consumption, it is still part of the total stock which in 
the aggregate regulates and controls price through the law of supply 
and demand.  Raich, 545 U.S. 1. Thus, the regulations at issue in 
Wickard and Raich are not untethered from commerce in the way that 
the claimed power is in this case.  
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For the founding generation, commerce, industry, labor, 
agriculture, trade, and navigation were all constituents of ―a certain 
propensity in human nature . . . to truck, barter, and exchange one 
thing for another‖; with the end result that mankind brought ―the 
different produces of their respective talent . . . , as it were, into a 
common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part of the 
produce of other men‘s talents he has occasion for.‖  Adam Smith, 
Wealth of Nations, at 9-10, 19, 22-23, 26, 81 (Prometheus Brooks 1991) 
(facsimile).  This is commerce.  Its hallmarks are spontaneity and 
voluntary activity; not a command to buy something.   
B. The Historical Context in which the Commerce 
Clause was Drafted Makes it Highly Unlikely 
that it Included a Power to Command a Citizen 
to Purchase Goods or Services From Another.  
The American Revolution was the direct result of parliament‘s 
claimed right to legislate for America, joined with actual attempts to do 
so.  The Stamp Act, repealed in the face of furious opposition, was the 
first attempt.  Then came the Townshend Acts, placing a duty on paper, 
glass, lead, paint and tea.     
As the struggle continued, all of the taxes except those on tea were 
repealed, leading to the Boston Tea Party, the Intolerable Acts, and the 
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First Continental Congress.  Throughout the period from the Stamp Act 
forward, Americans responded with non-importation and 
non-consumption agreements.   
The Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress of 
October 14, 1774 ―cheerfully consent[ed] to the operation of such acts of 
the British Parliament, as are bonfide, restrained for the regulation of 
our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial 
advantages of the whole empire to the mother-country, and the 
commercial benefits of its respective members.‖  However, Congress, in 
the very same document, promised ―To enter into a non-importation, 
non-consumption, and non-exportation agreement or association.‖  
Charles C. Tansill, Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union 
of the American States Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, 
Government Printing Office No. 398 (1927) http://avalon.law-
yale.edu/18th_century/resolves.asp.  Such boycott agreements were 
generally considered lawful even by the royal colonial governments.  
For example, ―[a]t New York the merchants held a meeting to join with 
the inhabitants of Boston; and against the opinion of the governor, the 
royal council decided that the meetings were legal; that the people did 
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but establish among themselves certain rules of economy, and had a 
right to dispose of their own fortune as they pleased.‖  George Bancroft, 
History of the United States, Vol. III at 287 (D. Appleton & Company 
1896).  Later in New York, ―where the agreement of non-importation 
originated, every one, without so much as dissentient, approved it as 
wise and legal; men in high station declared against the revenue acts; 
and the governor wished their repeal.‖  Id. at 359.  In Massachusetts, 
Governor Hutchinson  
looked to his council; and they would take no part in 
breaking up the system of non-importation.  He called 
in all the justices who lived within fifteen miles; and 
they thought it not incumbent to interrupt the 
proceedings.  He sent the sheriff into the adjourned 
meeting of the merchants with a letter to the 
moderator, requiring them in his majesty‘s name to 
disperse; and the meeting of which justices of peace, 
selectmen, representatives, constables, and other 
officers made a part, sent him an answer that their 
assembly was warranted by law.  
Id. at 369.  Even where legislatures were dissolved, the non-importation 
movement continued.  Upon dissolution of the Virginia General 
Assembly, the burgesses met by themselves and ―adopted the resolves 
which Washington had brought with him from Mount Vernon, and 
which formed a well digested, stringent, and practical scheme of 
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non-importation.‖  Id. at 348.  ―The assembly of Delaware adopted the 
Virginia resolutions word for word: and every colony South of Virginia 
followed the example.‖  Id.  The founding generation would have 
regarded as preposterous any suggestion that Great Britain could have 
solved its colonial problems by commanding Americans to purchase tea 
under the generally conceded power of parliament to regulate 
commerce. 
Additional historical arguments against the power of Congress to 
enact the mandate and penalty can be almost endlessly adduced.  For 
example, Alexander Hamilton, at the New York convention, ―not[ed] 
that there would be just cause for rejecting the Constitution if it would 
enable the Federal Government to ‗penetrate the recesses of domestic 
life, and control, in all respects, the private conduct of individuals.‘‖  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 592.  What cannot be adduced is a countervailing 
historical example under the Commerce Clause in favor of the mandate 
and penalty. 
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C. There is No Tradition of Using the Commerce 
Clause to Require a Citizen to Purchase Goods or 
Services from Another Citizen.  
―For nearly a century‖ after Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court‘s 
―decisions . . . under the Commerce Clause dealt rarely with questions 
of what Congress might do in the exercise of its granted power under 
the Clause, and almost entirely with the permissibility of state activity 
which it was claimed discriminated against or burdened interstate 
commerce.‖  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121.   
Beginning with the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, the 
Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, and other enactments after 1903, 
Congress began asserting its positive power under the Commerce 
Clause.  In doing so, it was met at first with significant checks from the 
Supreme Court.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121-22 and 122, n. 20 (collecting 
cases striking down congressional enactments).  ―In general,‖ the Court 
protected state authority over intrastate commerce by excluding from 
the concept of interstate commerce ―activities such as ‗production,‘ 
‗manufacturing,‘ and ‗mining,‘‖ and by removing from its definition 
activities that merely affected interstate commerce, unless the effect 
was ―direct‖ rather than indirect.  Id. at 119-20.  With respect to 
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citizens, the reach of the Commerce Clause was limited by the Fifth 
Amendment which, prior to 1938, was held to protect economic liberty 
through substantive due process.  Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton 
Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).  Because this regime viewed the 
regulation of economic activity to be illegitimate unless that activity 
harmed or threatened harm to someone else, Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45 (1905), it is inconceivable that the Commerce Clause prior to 
1938 would have been deemed to reach and control a citizen‘s decision 
not to engage in a commercial activity.  The question thus becomes, has 
the Supreme Court decided any case in the post-Lochner era that would 
warrant extending the Commerce Clause to authorize the mandate and 
penalty?  The answer is no.  
D. The Mandate and Penalty are Outside of the 
Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause as 
Measured by Supreme Court Precedent. 
The Secretary‘s reliance on precedent is based on over-reading 
Wickard and Raich in isolation from Lopez and Morrison.  (Doc. 21 at 
43-47). 
Although Wickard has been described as ―perhaps the most far 
reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate 
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activity,‖ Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, it involved the voluntary activity of 
raising a commodity which, in the aggregate, was capable of affecting 
the common stock of wheat.  It had been Filburn‘s practice to sell milk, 
poultry and eggs from animals fed with his home-grown wheat.  
Wickard at 114.  The parties stipulated that the use of home-grown 
wheat was the largest variable in the domestic consumption of wheat.  
Id. at 125, 127.  This permitted the Supreme Court to hold that ―even if 
[an] activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, 
it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a 
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this 
irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time 
have been defined as ‗direct‘ or ‗indirect.‘‖  Id. at 125 (emphasis added).  
This marks the affirmative outer limits of the Commerce Clause. 
What Wickard stands for, as Lopez and Morrison make clear, is 
not the proposition that the case ―expand[s] the commerce power to 
cover virtually everything,‖ as used to be said.  See David P. Currie, The 
Constitution in the Supreme Court the First Hundred Years 1789-1888, 
at 170 and note 89 (University of Chicago Press 1985).  Instead, 
Wickard establishes the principle that, when activity has a substantial 
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aggregate impact on interstate commerce, there is no as-applied, de 
minimis constitutional defense to regulation under the Commerce 
Clause.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 47-48 (O‘Connor, J., dissenting) (―The 
task is to identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate 
more than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and 
less than everything (by declining to let Congress set the terms of 
analysis).‖).  
Wickard describes itself as a return to the pure and sweeping 
doctrine established by Gibbons following the Court‘s excursion into 
Lochnerism.  Wickard, 317 U.S. at 119-25.  However, the dictum of the 
Wickard Court that Chief Justice Marshall had made statements in 
Gibbons with respect to the Commerce Clause ―warning that effective 
restraints on its exercise must proceed from political rather than from 
judicial processes‖ was a tautology that conceals more than it reveals.  
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120.  It is a tautology because it is true of any 
enumerated power that, when Congress is validly acting under the 
power, the only effective restraints are political.  See Morrison, 529 U.S. 
at 616, n. 7 (The ―assertion that from Gibbons on, public opinion has 
been the only restraint on the congressional exercise of the commerce 
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power is true only insofar as it contends that political accountability is 
and has been the only limit on Congress‘ exercise of the commerce 
power within that power’s outer bounds . . . .  Gibbons did not remove 
from this Court the authority to define that boundary.‖).  What it 
conceals is Marshall‘s actual holding in Gibbons that the terms ―to 
regulate‖ and ―Commerce . . . among the several States‖ are bounded, 
with judicially ascertainable meaning, and his further holding that the 
Commerce Clause does not reach transactions between persons which 
affect only intrastate commerce.  Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90, 
196.  
Since Wickard, the Supreme Court has progressed no further than 
to hold that Congress can regulate (1) channels of interstate commerce 
(2) instrumentalities of and persons and things in interstate commerce 
and (3) ―activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.‖  
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (emphasis added).  The majority in Raich 
went no further than to accept congressional findings that home-grown 
marijuana in the aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.  Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-19.  The challenge in Raich was not 
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facial, but involved an atomized, as-applied challenge of the sort 
foreclosed by Wickard.  Id. at 15, 23.  
The Supreme Court has also developed a workable negative rule 
for determining when the outer limits of the Commerce Clause have 
been exceeded:  a facial challenge will succeed when Congress seeks to 
regulate non-economic activities where the claimed power has no 
principled limits distinguishing it from a national police power.  Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 566-68.  As Justice Kennedy stated in his concurrence in 
Lopez:  ―Although it is the obligation of all officers of the Government to 
respect the constitutional design, the federal balance is too essential a 
part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a role in securing 
freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other 
level of Government has tipped the scales too far.‖  Id. at 578 (citations 
omitted).  
That principle was found applicable in Morrison because the 
federal government was attempting to exercise police powers denied to 
it by the Constitution.  Morrison at 618-19.  Not only are the mandate 
and penalty a part of the police power conceptually, but, historically, 
commands to act have been justified under the state police power.  See 
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Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (―protection of the lives, 
limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons‖ falls within state police 
power).   
E. The Mandate And Penalty Are Not A Valid 
Exercise Of Congress’s Power Under The 
Necessary And Proper Clause.   
Most of the Secretary‘s brief rests upon implicit or explicit appeals 
to the Necessary and Proper Clause.  (Doc. 21 at 47-63).  However, that 
provision ―is not itself a grant of power.‖  Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 
234, 247-48 (1960).  Furthermore, the affirmative outer limit of the 
Commerce Clause relevant to this case – activities substantially 
affecting interstate commerce – itself depends upon the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964); 
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).  It 
would be a mistake to assume that such power is part of the Commerce 
Clause itself, which can then be infinitely extended by the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (―Congress‘s regulatory authority over intrastate 
activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce 
(including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate 
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commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.‖).  Taken 
together, these cases recognize that Congress can regulate intrastate 
activity where such regulation is connected with and appropriate to 
Congress‘s power to regulate the interstate market.   
 In this way, Congress‘s power remains tethered to the text of the 
Commerce Clause.  It may reach interstate commerce directly.  It may 
reach economic intrastate activities substantially affecting interstate 
commerce even before they ripen into ―commerce‖ through trade, barter 
or sale, if they affect the common stock of a commodity.  Raich; 
Wickard.  The Secretary‘s view of the scope of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is both extravagant and untethered: ―Governing precedent 
leaves no room to override Congress‘s judgment about the appropriate 
means to achieve its legitimate objectives.‖  (Doc. 21 at 52).  The only 
way that this statement could be true would be for Morrison to be 
wrong in its explicit rejection of the view that the only limits on the 
Commerce Clause are political.  529 U.S. at 616.    
 Regulation may reach many things under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  However, the mode of regulation must fit the 
enumerated power by executing it – not by altering its character.  And 
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the question of fit is irrelevant unless the thing being regulated is 
proper.  The essential difference between Virginia and the Secretary 
turns on this point:  the Secretary believes that if a statute is necessary 
in the sense that ―‗the statute constitutes a means that is rationally 
related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power‘‖ 
that is the end of the inquiry.  (Doc. 21 at 55).  Virginia submits that 
there is also a proper prong to the Necessary and Proper Clause:   
When a ―Law . . . for carrying into Execution‖ the 
Commerce Clause violates the principle of State 
sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional 
provisions . . . , it is not a ―Law . . . proper for carrying 
into Execution the Commerce Clause,‖ and is thus, in 
the words of The Federalist, ―merely [an] act of 
usurpation‖ which ―deserves to be treated as such.‖  
  
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (emphasis in 
original).  The ―various constitutional provisions‖ referred to by the 
Court are those that underlie structural federalism, including the 
limitation of federal power to enumerated, delegated powers.  Hence, 
any application of the Necessary and Proper Clause that renders the 
concept of enumerated powers superfluous and is tantamount to the 
creation of a national police power fails under the proper prong. 
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 Although the Secretary cites United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 
1949 (2010), that opinion, contrary to her use of it, recognizes that 
Morrison’s negative outer limit denying the national government a 
police power applies to the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Comstock, 
130 S. Ct. at 1964 (―Nor need we fear that our holding today confers on 
Congress a general ‗police power, which the Founders denied the 
National Government and reposed in the States.‘‖) (citing Morrison).  
Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in the judgment in Comstock 
expressly stated:  ―It is of fundamental importance to consider whether 
essential attributes of State sovereignty are compromised by the 
assertion of federal power under the Necessary and Proper Clause; if so, 
that is a factor suggesting that the power is not one properly within the 
reach of federal power.‖  Id. at 1967.  
 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court elsewhere has 
emphatically held that the Necessary and Proper Clause is limited by 
general principles of federalism independent of any direct prohibition.  
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (―When a ‗Law . . . for carrying into 
Execution‘ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state 
sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions . . . it is 
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not a ‗Law . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,‘ 
and is thus, in the words of The Federalist, ‗merely [an] act of 
usurpation‘ which ‗deserves to be treated as such.‘‖) (citing Printz, 521 
U.S. at 923-24).  Not only are there clear federalism limits on the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, but those limits compel the conclusion 
that any attempt to exercise an unenumerated power, such as 
regulating the status of being uninsured, for the purpose of making the 
regulation of an enumerated power more efficient, is improper because 
the unenumerated power is, by definition, reserved to the States.  Once 
it is determined that an enactment is improper in this sense, there is 
nothing further to consider under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  
That is why the majority opinions in Morrison and Lopez find it 
unnecessary to engage the Clause.  It simply does not matter how 
―necessary‖ the mandate and penalty might be to the congressional 
scheme if the end being pursued is improper under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  That is the end of it.      
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F. The Decision To Forgo Insurance Is Not An 
Activity Substantially Affecting Commerce 
Within The Meaning Of The Necessary And 
Proper Clause.   
 The claim that the health care market is unique (Doc. 21 at 54) is 
false.  Any market can be affected through limiting supply or increasing 
demand.  Hence the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 at issue in 
Wickard could have, in economic theory, just as easily addressed the 
agricultural crisis by ordering citizens to purchase a certain measure of 
wheat.  The reason Congress could not adopt this approach is that it 
would not have been supported by an enumerated power.  In particular, 
it would not be a regulation of interstate commerce or of economic 
activities substantially affecting commerce.   
While it is true that Congress has directly regulated aspects of the 
health care system, principally by mandating emergency room 
treatment by hospitals receiving federal funds, Emergency Medical 
Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, (Doc. 21 at 55-56), 
the question in this case is whether Congress can command a citizen to 
purchase insurance solely for the convenience of the government in 
regulating market distortions caused, at least in part, by previous 
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congressional regulation.  That question must be answered in the 
negative for at least four reasons.  
 First, Congress cannot pass a law that distorts the market and 
then claim it must have all powers necessary to correct that distortion.  
Federal power is limited by the Constitution and cannot be extended by 
statute. 
Second, the notion that the federal government can issue naked 
commands that citizens live their lives for the convenience of the 
government is repugnant to historical constitutional thinking.  The 
Constitution was adopted not merely for the utilitarian benefits of 
government, but also to ―secure the Blessings of Liberty to‖ the 
Founders and their ―Posterity.‖  U.S. Const., Preamble.  As Alexander 
Hamilton told the New York convention, a constitution that ―enable[d] 
the Federal Government to penetrate the recesses of domestic life, and 
control, in all respects, the private conduct of individuals‖ would have 
been unworthy of ratification.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 592 (Thomas, J. 
concurring).  
 Third, the claim that citizens can be commanded to purchase 
goods or services from another citizen in order to increase the efficiency 
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of the federal government‘s regulation of commercial actors goes beyond 
the negative outer limits of the Commerce Clause, even as aided by the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, because the claimed power would be 
unlimited and indistinguishable from a national police power.  Lopez; 
Morrison.  
Fourth, the claim that Congress can use unenumerated powers to 
increase the efficiency of its use of an enumerated power is 
constitutionally incoherent in a government of enumerated powers.  By 
definition, all unenumerated powers ―are reserved to the states 
respectively, or to the people.‖  U.S. Const. amend. X.   
Although the mandate can be earnestly defended as addressing a 
matter of moral urgency (Doc. 21 at 54-56), the Supreme Court 
addressed the dangers of subordinating the Constitution to the 
perceived exigencies of the day last term in Free Enterprise Fund v. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 
(2010).  There the Court said:   
Calls to abandon [constitutional] protections in light of 
―the era‘s perceived necessity,‖ New York, 505 U.S. at 
187, are not unusual . . . .  The failures of accounting 
regulation may be a ―pressing national problem,‖ but ―a 
judiciary that licensed extraconstitutional government 
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with each issue of comparable gravity would, in the 
long run, be far worse.‖  Id. at 187-188.  
 The Secretary, citing the three district court cases that have 
upheld PPACA on the merits (Doc. 21 at 57), argues that ―‗the 
individuals subject to [the minimum coverage provision] are either 
present or future participants in the national healthcare market.‘‖  But 
they are not being regulated when acting in this capacity.  They are 
being regulated on account of the passive status of being uninsured.  
The two district courts that have found PPACA to be unconstitutional 
note that the claimed power is an unprecedented extention of existing 
doctrine.  (J.A. 328); Florida v. HHS, No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *71 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).  The district courts 
that have ruled in favor of the Secretary have noted that the regulation 
of inactivity in this fashion is, at the very least, novel.  Mead v. Holder, 
No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *66-67 (D.D.C. Feb. 
22, 2011); Liberty University, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEIXS 125922, at *48-49; 
Thomas More Law Center, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 893.  So, the Secretary‘s 
argument that Raich and Wickard directly supply the rule of decision in 
this case (Doc. 21 at 58-59) has not met with judicial favor.  Even the 
Secretary, in her docketing statement, characterized this case as one of 
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first impression.  Raich and Wickard not only fail to support the 
Secretary‘s position, they mark the existing affirmative outer limits of 
the Commerce Clause at a point well short of the power claimed by 
Congress in PPACA.  When Raich and Wickard are read together with 
Lopez and Morrison, it becomes clear that the mandate and penalty are 
unconstitutional.  
 The Secretary cites Liberty University (Doc. 21 at 60) for the 
proposition that choices are the constitutional equivalent of activities.  
But the choice not to buy is the default position for the human 
condition.  So, if the choice not to buy insurance is subject to regulation 
under the Commerce Clause, there is no valid limiting principle.  The 
Secretary complains that the district court found that her ―rationales 
for upholding the mandate and penalty ‗could apply to transportation, 
housing, or nutritional decisions.‘‖  (Doc. 21 at 60).  But, as the 
Northern District of Florida noted in its order granting a conditional 
stay, ―Former Solicitor General and Harvard Law Professor Charles 
Fried testified (during the course of defending the Constitutionality of 
the individual mandate) that under this view of the commerce power 
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Congress could, indeed, mandate that everyone buy broccoli.‖  Order of 
Mar. 3, 2011 at 4, n. 2, Florida (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV-EMT), Doc. 167.  
 Appealing once again to the exigencies bearing on the issue, the 
Secretary argues that the mandate and penalty ―prevent[ ] the 
substantial cost-shifting in the interstate healthcare services market 
that results from the practice of consuming healthcare without 
insurance.‖  (Doc. 21 at 61).  While the scope of congressional power is 
not defined by the wisdom of its enactments, this is not even the choice 
Congress made.  Unlimited cost-shifting is permitted to continue 
subject to the penalty.  Indeed, cost shifting is further aided by the 
Bankruptcy Code.  
 The Secretary‘s examples of supposed precedential regulation of 
inactivity are inapt.  (Doc. 21 at 62-63).  Superfund liability only 
attaches to an actor in interstate commerce.  United States v. Olin 
Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1997).  The Secretary‘s use of 
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845 (4th 
Cir. 1992) (Doc. 21 at 62-63), confuses the substantive, no-fault 
provisions of CERCLA with the Olin jurisdictional requirement.  
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 The Secretary‘s argument that ―federal laws regulating child 
pornography are triggered even when an individual comes into 
possession of child pornography innocently, without having taken any 
active measures,‖ citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252(c), (Doc. 21 at 63), overlooks 
the fact that § 2252(c) creates an affirmative defense.  The offense itself 
requires proof of a jurisdictional hook:  either (1) possession on federal 
lands or waters or in Indian Country or (2) use of the mails or 
movement in interstate commerce.  18 U.S.C. § 2252 (a)(4).  The Second 
Militia Act of 1792, ch. 38, § 1, 1 Stat. 264, 265 (requiring all free men 
to obtain firearms, ammunition, and other equipment) was supported 
by the express enumerated power of Congress ―To provide for 
organizing, arming, and discipling, the Militia . . .‖ U.S. Const. art. I, § 
8.  The requirement to provide arms, equipment and ammunition was 
deeply historical; that is how militias worked.  See 13 Hening’s Statutes 
At Large at 354-55 (Philadelphia 1823) (Militia to muster armed as 
required by law, all arms, ammunition and equipment exempt from levy 
for debt).  The power to call all gold into the Treasury discussed in 
Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935), was conceded by the 
parties and was based on the enumerated power ―To coin Money, 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 102      Date Filed: 03/28/2011      Page: 60
 50 
regulate the value therefore. . .‖  Because the power was conceded, the 
Court dismissed for want of damages, there being no legal market in 
gold.  When the Secretary discusses Lopez and Morrison (Doc. 21 at 63-
65), she seeks to atomize their principles and confine them to their 
facts.  Under the Secretary‘s view, when what has been recognized as 
commerce is being regulated, those cases simply have nothing to say.  
But what they clearly do say is this:  (1) the Commerce Clause has outer 
limits (2) those limits are justiciable and (3) those limits are violated by 
a claimed power with no principled limits.  
 The Secretary‘s statement that ―[t]he district court did not suggest 
that the Affordable Care Act intrudes into an area of regulation that is 
reserved to the states‖ (Doc. 21 at 65) is mistaken in an important way.  
Under our system of enumerated powers, any attempt to exercise an 
unenumerated power like the claimed power to require a citizen to 
purchase a good or service from another citizen is automatically an 
invasion of police powers reserved to the States. 
 When the Secretary argues that Congress has both the practical 
motive and the power to regulate aspects of the healthcare system on a 
national basis, what she says is uncontroversial.  (Doc. 21 at 65-70).  
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What is controversial – as the Congressional Research Service warned – 
is whether it may do so by employing as a means a command that 
citizens purchase a good or service from another citizen under threat of 
a penalty.  
 The Secretary ends her discussion of the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause with three propositions.  First, 
reacting to the discomfort caused by the fact that the claimed power 
would permit Congress to mandate the purchase of anything, she 
counsels:  ―The analysis cannot be driven by hypothetical statutes that 
no legislature would ever adopt.‖  (Doc. 21 at 69).  However, the 
corrolary is also true:  ―[T]he [Constitution] protects against the 
Government; it does not leave us at the mercy of noblesse obligue.  We 
would not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the 
Government promised to use it responsibly.‖  United States v. Stevens, 
130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010). 
 The Secretary quotes Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 197, for the 
principle that, in many instances, the only limits on congressional 
power are political.  (Doc. 21 at 70).  As we have already seen, the 
Morrison Court expressly noted that this was true only when Congress 
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is acting within its enumerated powers, and that it was for the Court to 
determine when it was not.  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616, 616 n. 7. 
 Finally, the Secretary appeals to Story‘s Commentaries:  ―Justice 
Story likewise recognized that it is manifestly incorrect to suggest that, 
‗because Congress had not hither to used a particular means to execute 
any . . . given power, therefore it could not now do it.‘‖  (Doc. 21 at 70).  
However apt that thought was at the beginning of a young republic, the 
experience of over 200 years cannot simply be ignored in constitutional 
adjudication.    
 For example, at the end of last term, the Supreme Court in Free 
Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3159, quoted Judge Kavanaugh‘s dissent 
in the Court of Appeals:  
―Perhaps the most telling indication of the severe 
constitutional problem with the PCAOB is the lack of 
historical precedent for this entity.  Neither the 
majority opinion nor the PCAOB nor the United States 
as intervenor has located any historical analogues for 
this novel structure.  They have not identified any 
independent agency other than the PCAOB that is 
appointed by and removable only for cause by another 
independent agency.‖  
 
In Printz, 521 U.S. at 918, the Court said the fact that Congress had not 
asserted a particular power for 200 years ―tends to negate the existence 
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of that power.‖  Finally, the five factors employed in deciding Comstock 
are deeply historical, causing PPACA to fail most of them.          
III. THE MANDATE AND PENALTY ARE NOT 
AUTHORIZED BY THE POWER TO TAX. 
 Although the district courts are divided on the constitutionality of 
PPACA, they are unanimous in declining to accept the taxing power 
argument.  As the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia noted in Mead, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592 at *69-70:  
In reaching its decision [to reject the taxing power 
argument], the Court notes that, to date, every court which 
has considered whether § 1501 operates as a tax has 
concluded that it does not.  See Goudy-Bachman, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6309, 2011 WL 223010, at *10-12; Liberty Univ., 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, 2010 WL 4860299, at *9-11; 
State of Florida, 716 F.Supp.2d at 1130-41; United States 
Citizens Ass’n, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123481, 2010 WL 
4947043, at *5; Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 
F.Supp.2d 768, 786-88 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
 
A threshold problem with the Secretary‘s resort to the taxing 
power is that no one can seriously call the mandate a tax.  Thus it 
requires some other enumerated power to support it. Sunshine 
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940); United States v. 
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936).  Furthermore, the penalty is a penalty, 
not a tax.  Of course, because the penalty is in aid of the mandate and 
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not in aid of a tax, the Secretary‘s attempt to rename the ―penalty‖ a 
―tax penalty‖ necessarily fails.  The remainder of the Secretary‘s taxing 
power argument exhibits a similar disregard of the ordinary meaning of 
words. 
At times, the Secretary stresses that it is the function and not the 
form that should govern in determining whether the penalty is actually 
a tax.  (Doc. 21 at 71).  However, any review of the statutory text and 
relevant precedent reveals that, both in name and operation, the 
penalty is not a tax. 
First, Congress itself called the penalty a ―penalty.‖  Elsewhere in 
PPACA, Congress levied taxes denominated as such, demonstrating 
that it knew how to draw the distinction.  See, e.g., PPACA §§ 9001; 
9004; 9015; 9017; 10907.  In the taxing arena, the Supreme Court has 
refused to permit litigants to denominate as a tax that which Congress 
has denominated an exercise of commerce power.  Bd. of Trustees of the 
University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 58 (1933). 
Second, the penalty, speaking historically and in light of 
traditional norms, is simply not a tax. ―‗A tax, in the general 
understanding of the term, and as used in the Constitution, signifies an 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 102      Date Filed: 03/28/2011      Page: 65
 55 
exaction for the support of the Government.‘‖  Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995) (quoting 
Butler, 297 U.S. at 61).  In contrast, the purpose of the penalty is to 
alter conduct in hopes that the penalty will not be collected at all.  
 The question whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty is itself 
justiciable.  United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572.  Although ―an 
Act of Congress which on its face purports to be an exercise of the 
taxing power,‖ and which is actually a tax and not a regulatory penalty, 
will be upheld without collateral inquiry into the regulatory motive of 
Congress, Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 511, 513-14 (1937), 
the PPACA penalty purports to be a penalty and not a tax.  
 For nearly a hundred years, the Supreme Court has recognized 
that ―taxes‖ and ―penalties‖ are separate and distinct, stating that ―‗[a] 
tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government; 
a penalty, as the word is here used, is an exaction imposed by statute as 
punishment for an unlawful act.‘‖  Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 
U.S. at 224 (quoting La Franca, 282 U.S. at 572).  As the Court held, 
the word ―tax‖ and the word ―penalty‖   
are not interchangeable, one for the other.  No mere 
exercise of the art of lexicography can alter the 
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essential nature of an act or a thing; and if an exaction 
be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by 
the simple expedient of calling it such.  That the 
exaction here in question is not a true tax, but a 
penalty involving the idea of punishment for infraction 
of the law is settled . . . . 
 
La Franca, 282 U.S at 572.  To prevail, the Secretary‘s taxing power 
argument requires that this Court first ignore Congress‘s express 
decision to denominate the individual mandate penalty a ―penalty,‖ and 
then to ―alter the essential nature‖ of the penalty by ignoring its 
function so that it can be called a tax.  Because such steps would have 
the Court rewriting the statute, as opposed to interpreting it, the 
Secretary‘s argument must fail.   
 The Secretary next argues that the ―Constitution itself uses four 
different terms to refer to taxation: tax, impost, duties and excises.‖  
(Doc. 21 at 73).  However, this cannot aid the Secretary because 
―penalty‖ is not one of those ―four different terms‖ and, as discussed 
above, has consistently been held to be something distinct from a tax, 
whether or not the tax is called a tax, impost, duty or excise.   
Inconsistently, having spent part of her opening brief arguing that 
it is function and not form that should govern a court‘s inquiry, the 
Secretary makes a form argument—that the location of the penalty in 
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the Internal Revenue Code essentially transforms it into a tax.  (Doc. 21 
at 71-72).  However, that argument is barred by statute and by 
Supreme Court precedent.  26 U.S.C. § 7806(b) (―No inference, 
implication, or presumption of legislative construction shall be drawn or 
made by reason of the location or grouping of any particular section or 
provision of this title . . . .‖); Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, 518 U.S. at 
223 (holding that a payment specifically denominated in the Internal 
Revenue Code as a ―tax‖ was actually a penalty and stating that ―[n]o 
inference of legislative construction should be drawn from the 
placement of a provision in the Internal Revenue Code.‖).  
In making this formalistic argument, the Secretary also cites, 
without quotation or specific reference, this Court‘s decision in In re 
Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996), which involved 
the question of whether premiums required to be paid under the Coal 
Act were actually taxes.  This Court, citing the Second Circuit‘s decision 
in In re Chateaguay Corp., 53 F.3d 478 (2nd Cir. 1995), held that the 
premiums were taxes.  However, the Coal Act, unlike PPACA, did not 
impose a ―penalty.‖  Rather, the  
purpose of the [Coal] Act was to establish a system 
whereby each current and former signatory operator--
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that is, each operator that ―is or was a signatory to a 
coal wage agreement,‖ as such agreements are defined 
in section 9701(b)(1) of the Act, see § 9701(c)(1) --is 
required to pay for the benefits provided to its own 
retirees and to share in the cost of providing benefits to 
orphaned retirees.   
 
In re Leckie, 99 F.3d at 576.  Thus, the Coal Act did not impose a 
―penalty‖ on coal companies, but rather, required them to pay annual 
benefit premiums consistent with their obligations under prior 
agreements.  Specifically:  
The Coal Act restricts liability for medical benefit 
premiums to companies that (1) signed one or more 
Wage Agreements between 1950 and 1988, (2) continue 
to ―conduct[] or derive[] revenue from any business 
activity, whether or not in the coal industry,‖ and (3) 
actually employed at least one retiree currently 
receiving benefits.  Id., § 9701(c). 
 
In re Chateaguay Corp., 53 F.3d at 486.  Thus, unlike the penalty in 
PPACA, Coal Act payments were not imposed because of the failure of a 
party to comply with a government command.  As the United States 
Supreme Court found in Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, that distinction 
is dispositive. 
 The Secretary also argues that any statute that is ―productive of 
some revenue‖ is a tax. (Doc. 21 at 71-72).  Given the Supreme Court‘s 
clear precedent that true monetary penalties, which, defintionally, are 
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―productive of some revenue,‖ are not taxes, this is simply not an 
accurate statement of the law.  Assuming that words are infinitely 
malleable, she also pronounces that the penalty is not really a penalty 
because it ―does not impose ‗punishment.‘‖ (Doc. 21 at 74).  This is easily 
refuted.  
In Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 776-77, the Supreme Court 
recognized that a civil penalty can constitute punishment for double 
jeopardy purposes.  However, in the very same case, the Court expressly 
stated that civil penalties are separate and distinct from taxes, holding 
that ―tax statutes serve a purpose quite different from civil penalties      
. . . .‖  Id. at 784.  Accordingly, the Secretary‘s suggested formulation, 
that civil penalties that do not impose punishment sufficient to trigger 
double jeopardy are in fact taxes, has been expressly rejected by the 
Supreme Court. 
The Secretary also argues that ―a tax ‗does not cease to be valid 
merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the 
activities taxed.‘  United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).‖ 
(Doc. 21 at 71).  However, by its terms, the Sanchez rationale only 
applies to taxes, not to penalties.  Moreover, even assuming that the 
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penalty had been denominated as a tax, it would still have to pass 
muster under an enumerated power other than the taxing power so long 
as it is really a regulatory penalty.  Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 
20.  See also Butler, 297 U.S. at 68; Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 
17-18 (1925).  These cases remain as binding authority.  Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).  
Ultimately, the Secretary‘s argument that these cases have fallen 
into desuetude rests on dicta contained in a footnote in Bob Jones 
University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 741, n. 12 (1974).  The footnote in 
question never mentions the Child Labor Tax Case (which is cited in 
the body of the case prior to the footnote) nor does it mention Butler or 
Linder, making it impossible to maintain that the footnote overruled 
those cases.  Id.  Second, the footnote, when read in its entirety, reveals 
itself as pure dicta: 
In support of its argument that this case does not 
involve a ―tax‖ within the meaning of § 7421 (a), 
petitioner cites such cases as Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 
44 (1922) (tax on unregulated sales of commodities 
futures), and Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922) (tax 
on unlawful sales of liquor).  It is true that the Court in 
those cases drew what it saw at the time as 
distinctions between regulatory and revenue-raising 
taxes. But the Court has subsequently abandoned such 
distinctions.  E.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 
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506, 513 (1937).  Even if such distinctions have 
merit, it would not assist petitioner, since its 
challenge is aimed at the imposition of federal 
income, FICA, and FUTA taxes which clearly are 
intended to raise revenue. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Finally, a review of the case cited in the footnote, 
Sonzinsky, reveals that it did not overrule the Child Labor Tax Case but 
instead treated it as binding precedent that had to be distinguished.  
Specifically, the Sonzinsky court wrote: 
The case is not one where the statute contains 
regulatory provisions related to a purported tax in such 
a way as has enabled this Court to say in other cases 
that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a means of 
enforcing the regulations. See Child Labor Tax Case, 
259 U.S. 20, 35; Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44; Carter v. 
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238. 
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513.  Simply put, the Supreme Court has never 
overruled the basic thrust of the Child Labor Tax Case: that a 
―purported tax‖ that is actually a penalty to force compliance with a 
regulatory scheme must be tied to an enumerated power other than the 
taxing power.   
 Moreover, the Child Labor Tax Case was cited with approval by 
the Supreme Court as recently as 1994: 
Yet we have also recognized that ―there comes a time 
in the extension of the penalizing features of the so-
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called tax when it loses its character as such and 
becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of 
regulation and punishment.‖ Id., at 46 (citing Child 
Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)). 
 
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779.  Given that the Supreme Court, as 
recently as 1994, cited the Child Labor Tax Case for the very 
proposition for which the Commonwealth offers it, it cannot reasonably 
be said that it is no longer good law.   
Ultimately, the problem with the Secretary‘s taxing power 
argument is that it is anti-textual, anti-historical and contrary to 
precedent.  The mandate and penalty are neither the regulation of 
commerce nor taxation; they are an exercise of police power denied to 
the federal government.  
IV. THE SEVERANCE RULING BELOW WAS 
ERRONEOUS.  
 In addressing the question whether or not the unconstitutional 
mandate and penalty are severable from the remainder of PPACA, the 
district court correctly noted that the court was required to determine 
whether the balance of the statute will function in a 
manner consistent with the intent of Congress in the 
wake of severance of the unconstitutional provision       
. . . [and] whether in the absence of the severed 
unconstitutional provision, Congress would have 
enacted the statute. 
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(J.A. 1113).  While the district court correctly identified the standard for 
its analysis, it misapplied that standard. 
 Specifically, the district court ordered that the mandate and 
penalty be severed from the remainder of PPACA, stating that it ―will 
sever only Section 1501 and directly-dependent provisions which make 
specific reference to Section 1501.‖  (J.A. 1114).  However, while there 
are many provisions of PPACA that even the Secretary concedes are 
―directly-dependent‖ on the mandate and penalty, no other provisions of 
PPACA make specific reference to § 1501.  Thus, despite the language 
suggesting that other provisions were to fall with the unconstitutional 
mandate and penalty, the effect of the district court‘s ruling was to 
sever the mandate and penalty from the remainder of PPACA, leaving 
all other provisions in force.  This was error. 
As noted above, the Secretary made a significant concession 
regarding severance below.  She conceded that, if the mandate and 
penalty were found unconstitutional, other ―provisions of the Act plainly 
cannot survive.‖  (J.A. 901).  Specifically, she acknowledged that the 
―insurance industry reforms‖ contained in PPACA ―cannot be severed 
from the‖ mandate and penalty, and therefore, had to be stricken if the 
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mandate and penalty were found to be unconstitutional.  (J.A. 902).  
Given that the Secretary has conceded that the district court, having 
found that the mandate and penalty were unconstitutional, should have 
stricken all ―insurance industry reforms‖ because their functioning in a 
manner consistent with the Congressional design was entirely 
dependent on the mandate and penalty, it was error for the district 
court not to strike those clearly dependent portions of PPACA. 
 However, the Secretary‘s concession represents the beginning 
rather than the end of the severance analysis.  While the parties agree 
that the insurance industry reforms must fall with the mandate and 
penalty, the Commonwealth believes that the entirety of PPACA must 
also fall.  While complete invalidity is the exception to the general rule, 
PPACA is, in this sense, exceptional. 
 Virginia has consistently maintained that severability issues must 
be resolved based on Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 678.  While the Court 
made clear in Alaska Airlines that ―Congress could not have intended a 
constitutionally flawed provision to be severed from the remainder of 
the statute if the balance of the legislation is incapable of functioning 
independently . . . [,]‖ id. at 684, such cases only represent a subset of 
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provisions that may not be severed.  Alaska Airlines also establishes 
that all provisions of an enactment must be stricken, even provisions 
that are unquestionably legitimate exercises of congressional power, if 
the ―statute created in (their) absence is legislation that Congress would 
not have enacted.‖  Id.  Specifically, citing a long line of cases, the Court 
wrote: 
―‗Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not 
have enacted those provisions which are within its 
power, independently of that which is not, the invalid 
part may be dropped if what is left is fully operative as 
a law.‘‖  
 
Id. (citations omitted).  The Court went on to note that, in determining 
severance questions, courts should be cognizant of the importance of the 
unconstitutional provisions to the overall ―legislative bargain.‖  Id. at 
685. 
 In the case of PPACA, it is impossible to credibly maintain that 
the ―legislative bargain‖ struck was not entirely dependent on the 
mandate and penalty.  The tortured legislative process that was utilized 
to enact PPACA resulted in its passing the House by the margin of 219 
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to 212, a fact the Secretary concedes.2  (J.A. 875).  The legislative 
history reveals an awareness that no change could be made in the 
House because the margin necessary to invoke cloture in the Senate 
had been lost because an intervening special election for the United 
States Senate in Massachusetts.  Hence, it is as well known as such a 
thing can ever be known, that any change, let alone a major change like 
the elimination of the mandate and penalty, would have caused PPACA 
to fail.   
Furthermore, the Secretary herself has described the mandate 
and penalty as the ―linchpin‖ of PPACA‘s insurance reforms.  (J.A. 51).  
In one of her filings in Florida, the Secretary noted that the insurance 
reforms and the people they allegedly would protect were ―a core 
objective of the Act‖ as a whole.  Reply in Support of Defendants‘ Motion 
to Dismiss at 29 (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV-EMT), Doc. 74 (Aug. 27, 2010).  
Clearly, anything that is a ―core objective of‖ PPACA is essential to the 
―legislative bargain‖ that produced it.  Thus, under Alaska Airlines, it is 
                                            
2 The Secretary misapprehends the significance of the narrow margin 
for passage.  It is true that a valid bill that passes by a one-vote margin 
is still validly passed.  However, when trying to determine what 
portions of a law can be severed from an unconstitutional section, the 
margin is significant in determining whether the remainder of the law 
would have passed without the constitutionally offensive provision.  
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clear that a finding that the mandate and penalty are unconstitutional 
is fatal to the entirety of PPACA.  Cf. Florida v. HHS, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8822, at *118-36. 
However, even if the mandate and penalty are severable from 
other parts of the act, it is clear that more than just the private 
―insurance industry reforms‖ must fall with the mandate and penalty.  
The Secretary has repeatedly argued that PPACA seeks to ―regulate the 
diverse methods by which consumers pay for health care services . . .‖ 
(Doc. 21 at 28) and ―regulates the means of payment for services in the 
interstate health care market . . . .‖ (Id. at 44-45).  According to the 
Secretary, it seeks to accomplish this by not only making changes to 
private insurance (presumably the ―insurance industry reforms‖ she has 
conceded are dependant on the mandate and penalty), but also by 
making changes to government programs, such as Medicare and 
Medicaid that the Secretary characterizes as ―insurance.‖ (Doc. 21 at 
22) (―The federal government provides health insurance for older and 
disabled Americans under Medicare . . .‖; ―Federal and state 
governments provide health insurance for low income Americans 
through Medicaid . . . .‖).  As argued above, the mandate and penalty do 
Case: 11-1057     Document: 102      Date Filed: 03/28/2011      Page: 78
 68 
not themselves regulate methods of payment.  But the associated 
changes in private insurance, Medicaid, and Medicare are related to the 
purpose stated by the Secretary.  
The logical conclusion of the Secretary‘s argument is that PPACA 
includes a comprehensive attempt to ―regulate the diverse methods by 
which consumers pay for health care services . . .‖ which are intended to 
work in concert with the mandate and penalty.  Thus, when the 
mandate and penalty fail, the regulation will not ―function in a manner 
consistent with the intent of Congress . . . . ,‖ Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. 
at 685, and therefore, all other related provisions fail as well.  
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the judgment of 
the district court related to severance and declare that the entirety of 
PPACA must fall given the unconstitutionality of the mandate and 
penalty.  Alternatively, this Court should, based on the concession of 
the Secretary and the logic of her arguments, strike those provisions of 
PPACA that relate to health care financing, including the private 
insurance industry reforms, changes to Medicare and changes to 
Medicaid.  At a bare minimum, as the Secretary concedes, the private 
insurance reforms should fall with the mandate and penalty.   
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the finding of unconstitutionality 
should be affirmed, the ruling on severance should be reversed, and the 
entirety of PPACA should be declared unconstitutional.   
  Respectfully submitted, 
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